Notes for 9/8/2026

 9/8/2026
Descartes offers a 2nd proof of God in M5. Why? And why wait until M5 instead of giving it right after the one in M3?

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")
Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:50 in CAS 436.][Ethics Bowl mtg today at 6:00pm]
 
Skeptical theism = the position that God’s superior knowledge so vastly outstrips ours that WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT to be aware of the reasons for which he permits evil.


Two major views of free will:
1.    Incompatibilism : Free will is incompatible with being determined to act one way rather than another.
2.    Compatibilism : Free will is compatible with at least some cases of being determined to act one way rather than another. 

God exists
The idea of God includes being good (not a deceiver)
Dismiss deceitful God hypothesis.
So, vivid and clear perceptions are trustworthy.
Truth Rule (whatever I perceive (conceive) vividly and clearly is true)




M4 addresses the question: If God is good, then why is there error at all?
(Epistemic version of the Problem of Evil)




Classic response to the Problem of Evil = Free Will Defense (God has the power to prevent evil but he permits it because the freedom to commit evil actions is required for creatures to have free will)



Descartes argues in M4 that error is our fault because whether or not we assent to a belief is a function of our wills (we choose to believe where we lack vivid and clear perception)





We have finite understanding/intellect
We have finite power
We have infinite will




When my will directs me to accept a statement (proposition/claim) as true, but my understanding is not vivid and clear, I risk error



My will outstrips my understanding: this is where error comes in

D appears to endorse “epistemic voluntarism” (beliefs are a matter of choice)




But can we choose to believe ANYTHING we want? 

2+2=5



Can we choose to believe any judgment except what is vivid and clear?

Unicorns exist


The 4390th digit of pi is 8





Liberty of indifference
View of free will that suggests that free will consists in being absolutely neutral with respect to two options and being able to choose one of them.



The liberty of indifference is a “low grade of freedom”



The more one is included toward a choice by good reasons, the more that choice is free.

(Is Descartes a compatibilist?)



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